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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES ON VOLUNTARY DELISTING PHENOMENON 
ABSTRACT 
The paper studies what drives firms to voluntary delist from capital markets and what 
differs in firms’ behavior and fundamentals between public-to-private transactions and 
M&A deals with listed corporations. Moreover, I study the relationship between 
ownership percentage in controlling shareholders’ hands and cumulative returns around 
the delisting public announcement. I perform my tests both for the Italian and the US 
markets and I compare the findings to better understand how the phenomenon works in 
these different institutional environments. Consistent with my expectations, I find that 
the likelihood of delisting is mainly related to size, underperformance and 
undervaluation, while shareholders are more rewarded when their companies are 
involved in PTP transactions than in M&As with public firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Delisting is a phenomenon which is carving out a significant role in literature during the 
last decades. The reason why experts and researchers are drawn to this phenomenon is 
mainly due to the will to find a general framework to understand why firms remove 
themselves from exchanges. There are two types of delisting: voluntary and involuntary. 
In this paper, I will focus the attention on the first, since it is more interesting to study 
firms’ behavior prior to the conscious exit from capital markets, than going private for 
not having met all the minimum requirements to continue to be publicly traded.  
To develop this empirical study, I analyze separately two different markets, in order to 
better understand the dynamics that affect the phenomenon. Major attention will be paid 
to the Italian market: this presents an interesting framework to be analyzed because it is 
an environment constituted by significant family businesses’ tradition and controlling 
shareholder prominence in the ownership base. The Italian sample will be compared 
with the S&P 500 Index sample, composed by delisted firms which constituted the 
homonymous index until the day before the removal. US capital markets have a 
different ownership structure with respect to the Italian environment, given its higher 
floating, as well as the presence of a widespread shareholder base. I will use data from 
2006 to 2010. The samples are constituted by firms traded on the FTSE Italia All-Share 
regarding the Italian pattern and on the S&P 500 Index for the homonymous sample. 
The total number of firms is respectively equal to 50 and 71. The study will be 
developed looking at fundamentals and financial indicators which have been considered 
as relevant given the existing literature on the argument. Shareholders’ returns are 
considered in terms of Cumulative Abnormal Return, or CAR, around the delisting 
public announcement, using a [-3; +3] daily window. 
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Testing the differences among delisted and survived companies in Italy through a Logit 
model, I found that firms which have been voluntary removed are more likely to be 
smaller in terms of size, undervalued and to underperform with respect to those which 
continued to be publicly traded. These findings are in line with the existing literature 
upon the argument. Moreover, studying the relationship between equity stakes in 
controlling shareholders’ hands and CARs around the delisting public announcement, I 
verified the hypothesis of a negative and significant coefficient. 
Comparing, instead, the two environments, I found larger returns in terms of CAARs 
with higher concentration on the day of delisting public announcement in the US 
market, rather than in the Italian one. Furthermore, larger CARs are gained by 
shareholders who invest in companies involved in PTP transaction than in M&A 
agreements with listed companies in Italy, while this difference cannot be highlighted in 
the US sample. Likewise, studying the differences among these kinds of transactions 
through another Logit model, firms taken from the S&P 500 Index showed no 
significant variables to highlight, while, on the FTSE Italia All-Share, going-private 
companies have more likelihood to be smaller and have higher Dividend Yields. 
The paper follows a specific structure. Section 2 will give a general overview on the 
voluntary delisting phenomenon, highlighting all its typologies. A literature review will 
follow in Section 3, where I will focus on the drivers which push firms to exit from 
capital markets and the characteristics which distinguish companies involved in PTP 
transactions from M&A deals with listed firms. Section 4 will highlight samples’ 
characteristics and descriptive statistics. In Section 5 I will illustrate the research 
methodology. In the following section, Section 6, I will present each step of the 
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analysis, together with my expectations, and discuss the results. Then, Section 7 will 
conclude the paper. 
2. OVERVIEW ON VOLUNTARY DELISTING 
The expression Voluntary Delisting is used whenever a firm removed itself from an 
exchange listing, though it still has all the legislative requirements to be still traded on 
the public market. Thus, it is necessary the agreement of the general meeting of 
shareholders, together with the board of directors, to render the removal effective. Each 
normative code established its own measures concerning delisting typologies, but, at 
least the European Member States, since the beginning of this century, have been 
experiencing a minimum harmonization thanks to the Takeover Directive by the 
European Union (2004/25/EC Directive). Despite of the research for a full coordination, 
there are still differences among Member States, due to difficulties and delays in 
implementation, which are leading to the undesirable result of not full alignment in the 
procedures (Van Der Elst, Van Den Steen, 2009). The implication is reflected into the 
confusion and the consequent harm in individual and minority shareholders, which may 
face different levels of protection depending on the country. 
Regarding typologies, it is possible to have different way to voluntary delist a company. 
According to De Angelo, De Angelo and Rice (1984), the first way to be delisted from 
financial markets is the incorporation: a firm can be incorporated into another firm’s 
balance sheet after an acquisition. This operation can be done by a private or a public 
company. Whenever the acquirer is a private company, the target will be involved into a 
public-to-private (PTP) transaction, which would not allow the firm to be traded on 
capital markets anymore; on the other hand, in the case the acquirer is a public 
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company, which is regularly traded on the exchange listing, the target firm would 
theoretically not exist anymore because it would be incorporated into another company 
as before, but their assets would increase the value of the acquirer’s equity. The 
difference here stands in the nature of the offer: while, in PTP transactions, the acquirer 
announces a tender offer to purchase the totality of the shares, when the bidder is a 
public firm there could be the alternative of an exchange offer, which is done through an 
exchange ratio (Berk, DeMarzo, 2007). Another technique, besides incorporation, is the 
creation of a shell corporation. This is more likely to be used in pure going-private 
transactions, where the target firm is combined with another company, which has been 
constituted expressly for taking the first out of the market. In this case, through a tender 
offer, the shell corporation’s management becomes the unique owner of the firm (De 
Angelo et al., 1984).  
The last tool to focus on is the one which characterized the first M&A wave in 1980s 
and it has been the most used technique for voluntary delistings during that period 
(Geranio, Zanotti, 2006): the Leveraged Buy-Out. This is typically a PTP operation, 
mostly led by Private Equity firms. The total value of firms acquired through LBOs 
between 1970 and 2007 accounts for $3.6 trillion, where $2.7 have been capitalized 
only in the first seven years of the twenty-first century (World Economic Forum, 2008). 
Whenever, instead, the buyer is constituted by the management of the firm itself, the 





3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1THE CHOICE BETWEEN STAYING PUBLIC AND GOING PRIVATE 
The most important factors that affect the choice of preferring the private market instead 
of the ongoing trading on public listings can be highlighted analyzing the existing 
literature. The first evident signal for PTP transactions is firm’s undervaluation 
(Geranio, Zanotti, 2006). Undervaluation may be mainly driven by lack of interest by 
the market, no matter firm’s results, performance and future expectations. This leads to 
differences in value perception between outsiders and insiders. Therefore, 
undervaluation is brought by information asymmetries (Goh et al., 2001): insiders are 
more aware of target firm’s potential and future earnings growth, while, on the other 
hand, outsiders can just rely on public data or releases issued by the company, which 
maybe are not presenting a correct snapshot of the firm. Moreover, the gap may be also 
led by managers’ scarce capabilities in communicating the market firms’ value creation.  
Due to amendments and introductions of new legislations for listed companies, such as 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in United States, the costs of staying listed are one of the most 
important causes which lead a company to abandon capital markets and go private. 
Even if these costs, from disclosure obligations to investor relations, are considered 
when a company plans to enter capital markets through the IPO, changes in legislation 
and the rising of the cost bar for being listed have constituted a serious problem for 
public companies during the last decade. “Many of the smaller companies that went 
public in the late 1990s and foreign issuers that entered the US market may wish to 
rethink their decision” (Carney, 2005). From 2003, the year after the SOX Act was 
emanated, in fact, it has been experienced a huge increase in going private filings on the 
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US market: 101 firms exited the market in 2003 and 114 in 2004, compared to 59 
companies in 2002, experiencing a 71.19% increase just in one year. 
Removal from capital markets may also constitute a way to hide from competitors, so 
acting without being monitored by them or the whole market in general. Listing 
requirements are, as it has just mentioned above, expensive and time consuming, but, at 
the same time, to reach transparency and fairness targets, they extremely expose all the 
public firms to everybody has interests in a specific company. Therefore, it may happen 
that, following a strategic rationale, a company would exit capital markets through the 
voluntary removal from listing to darken itself from the world market, so avoiding 
disclosing their financial data. 
Another element to consider is the size of the firm, together with the portion of floating 
shares (Arbel, Strebel, 1982). Low floating transforms the liquidity advantage of staying 
public into an illiquidity issue. Although smaller firms tend to outperform the market 
(Fama, French, 1995), it is very difficult to find relevant and reliable information on 
them. Furthermore, institutional investors may not consider small caps with low free 
floating due to the above cited illiquidity issue: liquid shares’ investments are easier to 
withdraw without market impact. Thus, institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
even if small caps shares are relatively cheaper with respect to larger ones, may not 
consider buying portions of these kinds of firms’ equity. 
Being on capital markets means for any company to construct a solid and pertinent 
dividend policy, in order to build up a strong image of the business and construct behind 
it a stable group of stockholders (Jensen, 1986). Dividend policies offer a snapshot of 
the company for any investor who wants to be shareholder. The so called value and 
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growth firms are both linked, among other characteristics, to their payout policies and a 
change in it could be not fully understood by their owners. Therefore, if a value 
company wanted to pursue growth strategies thinking about changing its dividend 
policy, it could face reluctance in the existing shareholder base, which may withdraw 
their investment and, as a consequence, lower company’s share price. Thus, in order not 
to let the value of the company collapse, dividend payout policy, even if not as 
significantly as the previous factors, could induce firms to exit capital markets. 
Evidences show that the number of firms which are exiting the market a few years later 
the IPO is increasing (Geranio, Zanotti, 2006). Short life as public firm may be driven 
by two motivations: the will to exploit a short-term bull market, exiting it once the 
favorable condition is over, and the awareness of having made the wrong choice listing 
on markets. In this last case, the IPO price is higher than the last reported price, 
generating a loss. On the other hand, when firms exploit an upward market, they are 
more likely to experience positive difference between the last and the IPO price.  
There are not only advantages in going private transactions, because, in any case, the 
company will not be public anymore, which means that it would not be as easily 
reachable and transparent as before. Going private would mean to face higher relative 
difficulties in raising capitals for investments, since the firm is not anymore easy to 
control and monitor through its disclosure obligations. Therefore, this translates into a 
higher firm’s cost of capital (Bartlett III, 2008). Not being anymore traded on capital 
markets give further drawbacks for shareholders, the owners of the company. PTP 
transactions lead to shares’ illiquidity. Thus, shareholders may be forced to be owners 
of something they do not want to. This problem may affect both controlling and 
minority shareholders, but it harms minorities more than others, since they do not have 
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any discretionary power. Some firms, in fact, in order to limit this potential drawback, 
give minorities the chance to trade shares on a predefined bargain basis to their broker 
(DLA Piper, 2009). Clearly, this is not the most favorable solution for minority 
shareholders, but at least companies give the opportunity to exit the investments, since 
holding illiquid shares may become frustrating. 
The last point that can be relevant to raise is about the operating performance after 
voluntary delisting. PTP transactions are also considered for exploiting growth 
investment opportunities, but evidences on Continental Europe throughout this last 
century underline the difficulty to achieve the purposed operational targets. In fact, 
empirical findings by Croci and Del Giudice (2014) do not report any substantial 
positive change in profitability, highlighting a relative stable operating performance 
after the removal. 
3.2 WHAT DIFFERS M&A WITH LISTED COMPANIES FROM PTP TRANSACTION 
There are several characteristics that are relevant to highlight regarding firms which are 
involved in going-private and still-listed transactions. In a publication by Weir and 
Wright (2006), the first paper in literature of this genre, the analysis covers both 
financial and governance factors. Going-private firms have lower growth prospects than 
acquired firms by public corporations. This can be explained by the fact that, whether a 
public firm has high, or at least valuable, growth opportunities, in order not to waste the 
chance to more than increase its value thanks to market reactions, it would never decide 
to darken itself from capital markets going private.  
However, the most relevant findings relative to this difference concern governance and 
ownership structure, rather than the financial point of view. PTP corporations, in fact, 
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are more likely to have insiders than firms subject to M&A by listed companies. This 
can be explained as follows: having a higher percentage of insider ownership means to 
be more aware of the real capabilities of the firms. For more concentrated management 
ownership firms, indeed, it is more likely to exploit PTP transactions through, for 
instance, MBOs, rather than sell the firm to a listed company, or merging with it, so 
losing the power in their hands.  
4. SAMPLES’ CHARACTERISTICS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The Italian and the S&P 500 Index samples of firms that were delisted between 2006 
and 2010 are constituted by 50 and 71 firms respectively. In both cases the number of 
delistings is very high, even more if, in the Italian market, this is compared with the 
number of IPOs for the same time horizon, which is equal to 68 and, among these, 5 
companies voluntary delisted during the same period and are part of the sample under 
study. 
Table 1 presents the number of delistings for each year in the sample. The highest 
number of delistings is experienced in both the samples in the first year of financial 
crisis. The recession, in fact, started in 2007 in the United States, while the Italian 
sample, on the other hand, experienced the highest number of removals from trading the 
following year, which can be considered the year when the financial crisis from US 
started to widespread to the rest of the world. Another important remark can be done 
upon this point, since the second highest number can be observed in 2006, when the 
financial crisis was not spread yet, not even in the United States. According to Bordo 
(2008), in fact, the first turmoil happened in August 2007, when the freezing of the US 
lending market occurred, while the second wave, when the crisis worsened, occurred in 
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March 2008, when Bear Stearns was rescued. The investment bank was bailed-out 
through an M&A agreement with the same company which led the rescue of the first 
severe financial crisis which affected US in 1907, JP Morgan. Bear Stearns has been 
included in the S&P 500 sample and it is the one which experienced the largest negative 
CAR (-117.29%) in the considered event study window. 
On the wave of the paper written by Weir and Wright (2006), I will analyze what drives 
firms to be target in PTP transactions rather than M&A deals with already listed 
companies. Table 2 presents the number of delistings from each type, which will lead to 
some first descriptive comments. As it is possible to see from the table, two thirds of the 
Italian firms went private during the sample period, while the distribution is completely 
different (23.94%) regarding the S&P 500 Index sample. This may be explained by the 
large difference in terms of firms’ size among the two considered groups. In fact, while 
the average market value of the Italian firms is equal to €2.1 billion, the same value 
regarding the US sample is equal to $11.96 billion. Thus, recalling the existing 
literature, smaller firms are more likely to go private (Geranio, Zanotti, 2006). An 
additional comment regarding this argument can be done looking at the remaining 54 
companies in the US sample. In fact, it is possible to observe that 39 companies out of 
these 54 continued to be traded on the S&P 500 Index, notwithstanding the delisting. 
This may be driven by two explanations: the firm has been acquired by (or merged 
with) a former constituent of the same index; the resulting corporation from the M&A 




5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
In order to conduct a deep analysis of delisted firms’ characteristics, I downloaded data 
from Datastream for all the observations regarding Market-to-Book ratio, EV/EBITDA, 
Earnings Per Share, Price-Earnings ratio, Debt-to-Equity ratio, Dividend Yield, natural 
logarithm of Market Value and Total Assets. To deepen the analysis, I added lagged 
variables as well for all the fundamentals. These lagged variables concern the previous 
financial year with respect to the delisting public announcement. I run several Logit 
models for each step of the study to isolate the significant variables, so finding the most 
appropriate ones to explain the phenomenon. Returns are considered in terms of 
Cumulative Abnormal Return, or CAR, around the delisting public announcement. I use 
a [-3; +3] daily window, since the [-30; +30] interval would have been very large and 
dispersed from the public announcement, while the [-1; +1] could have been consistent 
only assuming strongly efficient capital markets. Moreover, I took data regarding 
controlling shareholders’ ownership percentage at the moment of the delisting 
announcement concerning firms in the Italian sample to study their relationship with 
cumulative returns. 
6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND COMMENTS 
6.1 FIRST LOGIT MODEL 
The first step to achieve is to develop a Logit Model highlighting the differences 
between delisted firms and survived companies on the Italian market throughout the 
considered time horizon. Regarding the survived firms, each year each of them has been 
treated as a different company. The number of listed firms is equal to 105, with a total 
number of observations equal to 507. I compare these to the 50 components in the 
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Italian sample. Focusing on the hypothesis, referring to the existing literature, I expect 
the delisted firms to be smaller in terms of size, to have a lower Market-to-Book ratio, 
used as indicator for undervaluation, to be less profitable in terms of EV/EBITDA, and 
to be more leveraged. The other variables, especially the lagged ones, have been added 
to have a clearer overview of the phenomenon. Model 1 in Table 3 includes all the 
variables of the dataset; Models 2 and 3 respectively consider actual and lagged 
variables alone; finally, Model 4 highlights just one variable among actual and lagged 
looking at the statistical significance (z values) observed in the previous models, 
picking each time the one with the highest value. 
The results show that there are some variables which clearly give the investors an 
insight on firms’ decisions to voluntary remove from listing in the Italian market. 
Starting to comment the findings, it is possible to say that delisted companies are more 
likely to have a leveraged capital structure in the year prior to the public announcement 
of removal from exchanges. In this particular sample, it is important to underline the 
high number of LBOs carried on by Private Equities, 11. Thus, they have a relevant role 
even in an environment characterized by family businesses and high percentage of 
controlling shareholders. What happens, in fact, sometimes, is that a Private Equity 
company accords with insiders to carry on the deal in order not to have any kind of 
drawbacks from them. The reason why lagged EPS has a negative and significant 
coefficient can be found in underperformance: firms which are voluntary removed from 
the Italian market are worse performing than the survived ones. Furthermore, the model 
shows that delisted firms are more likely to have higher Dividend Yields. The reason 
could be found in the will to remunerate shareholders before it is too late.  
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The other variables to focus on are those included in Model 4, the one which gives a 
stronger insight on the drivers that lead to voluntary delisting in Italy. Market Value and 
Total Assets moves in opposite directions: delisted firms are more likely to have higher 
market capitalization and lower total assets during the year of public announcement of 
removal from exchange. The first variable can be explained by the large CAR 
shareholders experience due to the delisting announcement, while the second is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms which opt to voluntary remove themselves 
from listing are smaller than the survived ones. To conclude, the hypothesis regarding 
undervaluation is verified as well, given that the Market-to-Book ratio’s coefficient of 
the lagged variable is negative and significant. 
6.2 REGRESSION ON CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN 
The purpose now is to find a relationship between CAR and percentage of ownership by 
controlling shareholders at the public announcement of delisting in the Italian sample. 
The interest towards this issue derives from the will to give this paper an individual 
investor’s perspective, rather than looking at data from the perspective of an external 
viewer. The number of firms is 42, since I deleted from the existing sample the 
companies whose ownership data were not available. The hypothesis to support 
concerns the negative relationship between CAR and the percentage of ownership in 
controlling shareholders’ hands: investors would perceive lower CARs as the 
percentage owned by majorities’ increases. I add some control variables, in particular 
those regarding size, performance, valuation and capital structure: Market-to-Book 
ratio, EV/EBITDA, D/E, natural logarithms of Market Value and Total Assets. Table 4 
shows the results of the regression on the CAR. 
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From a first look at the table, it is possible to observe that the hypothesis has been 
verified, since there is negative relationship between CAR and controlling shareholders 
ownership at the delisting public announcement. P-value and the t-statistic even more 
underline variable’s significance. This result gives relevant insights for minority 
shareholders, to better understand and even predict the range of their CAR in case of 
voluntary delisting: the more the majorities and insiders hold in their hands in terms of 
ownership, the less the shareholders gain from delisting. The reason can be explained by 
the lower chance by minorities to impede the delisting transaction, since controlling 
shareholders, as their ownership increases, encounter fewer obstacles, due to their 
significant presence, in terms of vote, both in the general meeting and in the board of 
directors. 
All the other variables, which have been included in the model as controls, do not give 
any additional remark to make, since their t-statistics and p-values are not statistically 
significant, except from Debt-to-Equity ratio, although its coefficient is very low. 
However, it is not surprising that there is negative relationship between CAR and D/E, 
because this means that the more a company is leveraged, the less its shareholders gain 
from the transaction. 
6.3 COMPARING CAARS AMONG THE SAMPLES 
The third step in this study focuses on AAR and CAAR distributions in order to 
compare and contrast the two samples. I expect a higher CAAR for S&P 500 companies 
rather than the Italian ones, given institutional and ownership structures already 
highlighted. Table 5 summarizes the distribution for each sample in terms of AAR, on 
the left-hand side, and CAAR, on the other side. The first values which capture the 
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attention are the CAAR for the whole 7-days interval around the public announcement: 
10.53% for the Italian sample and 15.10% for the S&P 500 Index sample. The gap 
among these two markets is extremely high, since the second exceeds the first by 
43.44%, verifying the hypothesis stated earlier above. This gap can be attributed by 
several factors. The most relevant to highlight is the ownership composition: Italian 
firms are businesses led by families or large controlling shareholders and the previous 
regression verified how companies with larger ownership percentages lead to lower 
CAAR for the shareholder base. 
Looking at several publications on the argument, which have been focused more on 
PTP transactions than including all the kinds of voluntary delisting, the authors noted a 
higher premium, also due to a larger event-study window. De Angelo, De Angelo and 
Rice (1984) used a 10 days anticipation window, verifying a premium to shareholders, 
in terms of CAAR, equal to 28.05%. The same can be found looking at another 
publication, this time by Lehn and Poulsen (1989), which, analyzing an equal-length 
window to the previous authors, noted a CAAR equal to 19.30%. Different event study 
windows lead to different results. It has to take into account that each analysis considers 
a different time horizon. I, in fact, considered delisting transactions during a tough time 
for capital markets, probably even more for the US than for Italy. The samples, in fact, 
included several companies which have experienced big losses, in terms of performance 
as well as stock prices and CAR around the delisting announcement. One of them can 
be the already cited investment bank Bear Stearns, which was acquired and bailout by 
JP Morgan. In March 2008, when it was announced the delisting procedure with the 
consequent purchase by JP Morgan, shareholders experienced a notable negative CAR 
(-117.29%), with an abnormal return of -82.8% just on the day of announcement. If, in 
 16 
fact, Bear Stearns and all the other firms which have experienced negative CARs had 
been excluded from the sample, then the gap with respect to the Italian sample would 
have been even larger: the resulting CAAR for the S&P 500 Index sample would have 
reached up to 17.82%. 
Furthermore, one third of the whole CAAR (33.02%) has been already gained before 
the announcement in the Italian sample, while the percentage for the second sample is 
quite irrelevant, since the CAAR before the announcement is just equal to 1.16% 
(7.69% of the 7-days window CAAR). The only possible explanation of this 
phenomenon is investors’, or, to better say, insiders’ prior knowledge about the 
transaction. The US market may represent, in this case, an example of semi-strong form 
of market efficiency, given the immediate shift and adjustment once the information 
comes out. This does not mean that there is any kind of forms of insider trading in Italy, 
but maybe there is a higher security leak in Italy than in US, which leads the stock price 
to go up before the public announcement. 
6.4 SECOND LOGIT MODEL AND CAARS HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
The second Logit Model to develop for the empirical study has the objective to give 
deeper insights on which are the drivers to distinguish delisted firms involved in PTP 
transactions to those which are acquisition targets for listed companies. The study will 
be led both for Italy and US. Concerning the hypothesis for this section, size is expected 
to be smaller for firms which have been taken private, recalling the existing literature. 
Acquisition targets for listed firms are expected to have higher Market-to-Book ratio 
than going-private companies, since it is known that firms are often taken out of public 
markets by Private Equities or insiders to mainly exploit undervaluation opportunities. 
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In the last part of this section I will compare CAARs from the same subsamples. I 
expect to find a clear difference in terms of CAAR among these two typologies, in favor 
of PTPs, and I will test this through a hypothesis test on the difference of the means. 
Table 6 represents the models run on the Italian sample. Starting analyzing the findings, 
firms involved in public-to-private transactions are more likely to have lower Price-
Earnings ratio and Dividend Yield. A constantly lower DY, even regarding the lagged 
variable, represents lower relative dividend payments during the last two years. On the 
other hand, a lower PE ratio leads the investors to expect lower earnings’ growth in the 
future. Correlation in sign among these two variables is very interesting, given that 
several studies verify strong inverse relationship among these two variables (Crestmont 
Research, 2014). Further remarks concern valuation and size issues. Recalling the 
hypothesis expressed above, I expected going-private firms to be smaller and relatively 
undervalued than companies involved in deals with already public firms. Looking at the 
Market Value, the negative and statistically significant coefficient highlights a smaller 
size in terms of market cap for going-private companies. This result, however, is not 
consistent with other two variables, since both Total Assets and the Market-to-Book 
ratio are more likely to be larger in the case of firms involved in PTP transactions. This 
means that equity is more valuable in the case of going-private companies, but, at the 
same time, the inverse relationship among MV and TA may lead to think about 
undervaluation. For the misleading results upon this last finding, it is not possible to 
give a univocal conclusion about undervaluation. 
Once analyzed the Italian sample and having highlighted the differences among its 
subsamples, the focus now passes on the S&P 500 Index. Table 7 summarizes the 
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findings. I decided not to report any Model 3, since it would have made no sense to 
highlight results which were not significant and not able to give any more valuable 
outcomes. In the light of the results, it is evident that there are no clear differences in 
fundamentals and indicators between the two subsamples. The only note can be made 
on the variable regarding Total Assets, since in both the models I found that going-
private companies are more likely to denote lower values in both the two years prior to 
the delisting. The reasons which have led to results like these, full of no evident 
differences among subsamples, can be given by the particular conformation of the S&P 
500 Index: being constituted by the largest and most active firms on the NYSE, it is 
very unlikely for a particular group of firms to clearly distinguish itself from another 
one, especially in performance, since constant underperformance, for instance, would 
mean to leave the Index. The sample under study, in particular, is heterogeneously 
composed, presenting representatives of several sectors: for example firms from 
consumers’ goods, pharmaceutical or information technology industries, are present in 
both the subsamples. The only exception is given by financial services’ firms. These 
companies, in fact, given their relevance and exposure, together with the economic 
crisis ongoing in the considered period, have been all incorporated in listed companies. 
To conclude, comparing CAARs of both subsamples, through a t-test, as it is reported in 
Table 8 and 9, concerning the Italian sample, firms involved PTP transactions show a 
higher CAAR than the ones acquired by public companies, verifying the stated 
hypothesis. P-value is approximately equal to 0.001, so highlighting the gap between 
the subsamples. Since, in case of PTP transactions, shareholders would be expropriated 
by the right to benefit from firm’s future cash flows, they realize higher returns in the 
considered 7-day window around the public announcement of delisting. By contrast, in 
 19 
case of companies incorporated in already listed firms, shareholders are almost always 
rewarded through exchange offers, so becoming stockholders of a “de facto” new firm. 
The same conclusion cannot be made upon the S&P 500 index sample, since, given a 
very low t-statistic (0.46), the hypothesis is not verified: there is no evidence in 
difference among subsamples’ CAARs, despite the fact, looking at the averages, PTP 
transactions rewarded almost 2% more than M&A deals with public companies. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to study voluntary delisted firms’ characteristics in terms 
of fundamentals and financial indicators in Italy, comparing findings and results with 
removed companies from S&P 500 Index. To study this phenomenon, I took data from 
2006 to 2010, finding 50 voluntary delisted firms from Borsa Italiana, the Italian stock 
exchange, and 71 from the S&P 500 Index. The existing literature upon this subject has 
always focused the attention more on US and UK markets, due to the higher economic 
interests and the conformation of the environment, than on Continental European 
countries. Thus, comparing these two samples, I wanted to understand how markets’ 
characteristics conduct to different results. In the light of this, the most relevant 
evidences concern the differences between firms involved PTP transactions and those 
incorporated in listed companies: the lack of statistical significance both regarding 
fundamentals and CAAR hypothesis test reveals no substantial differences among 
delisted companies in the S&P 500 sample; on the other hand, the results regarding the 
Italian sample, verifying the majority of the stated hypothesis, highlight relevant 
insights. Going-private companies are smaller and experience higher and significant 
CARs than those entered in M&A agreements with listed firms, as if they wanted to 
reward their shareholders before it is too late. 
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Furthermore, focusing the attention on fundamentals regarding size, valuation and 
performance, I tested the observations from the Italian sample to find whether firms in 
that country show the same features the existing literature underline. I found a greater 
likelihood of leveraged structure, underperformance, undervaluation and smaller size in 
delisted rather than still public firms. Moreover, another important objective I wanted to 
achieve developing this study was to try to find a relationship between CAR around the 
delisting public announcement and the percentage of ownership by controlling 
shareholders. Hypothesizing a negative relationship, the Italian sample confirmed that 
the more the majorities have in terms of ownership, the less the shareholder base gains 
from voluntary delisting. 
Interesting cues for future researches, maintaining this structure of constant comparison 
between two different institutional environments, may be constituted by studying firms’ 
operational performance after voluntary delisting and comparing it with their 
expectations, in order to understand whether the choice to exit from capital markets has 
been the right one. 
 
REFERENCES 
Arbel, Avner; Strebel, Paul. 1982. “The Neglected and Small Firm Effects.” Financial 
Review, 17(4): 201-218; 
Bartlett III, Robert P. 2008. “Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the 
Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms' Going-Private Decisions.” UGA Legal Studies 
Research Paper, n° 08-003; 
Berk, Jonathan; Demarzo, Peter. 2007. Corporate Finance, Pearson International 
Edition; 
 21 
Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Gopalan, Radhakrishnan; Thakor, Anjan V. 2008. “Market 
Liquidity, Investor Participation and Managerial Autonomy: Why do firms go private?.” 
The Journal of Finance, 63(4): 2013-2059; 
Bordo, Micheal D. 2008. “An Historical Perspective on the Crisis of 2007-2008.” 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper n° 14569; 
Carney, William J. 2005. “The Costs of Being Public after The Sarbanes-Oxley: The 
Irony of “Going Private”.” Emory Law Journal, 55: 141-160; 
Crestmont Research. 2014. “Dividend Yield vs. P/E Ratio”; 
Croci, Ettore; Del Giudice, Alfonso. 2014. “Delistings, Controlling Shareholders and 
Firm Performance in Europe.” European Financial Management, 20(2): 374-405; 
DeAngelo, Harry; DeAngelo, Linda; Rice, Edward M. 1984. “Going Private: 
Minority Freezeouts and Stockholders Wealth.” Journal of Law & Economics, 27(2): 
367-401; 
De Maeseneire, Wouter; Brinkhuis, Samantha. 2012. “What Drives Leverage in 
Leveraged Buyouts? An Analysis of European Leveraged Buyouts’ Capital Structure.” 
Accounting & Finance 52: 155-182; 
DLA Piper.,2009. “Delistings and Share Buy-Backs.” Venulex Legal Summaries; 
Fama, Eugene F.; French, Kenneth R. 1995. “Size and Book to Market Factors in 
Earnings and Returns.” Journal of Finance 50(1): 131-155; 
Geranio, Manuela; Zanotti, Giovanna. 2006. “Equity Markets Do Not Fit All: An 
Analysis of Public to Private Deals in Continental Europe.” European Financial 
Management, 18(5): 867-895; 
Goh, Jeremy; Gombola, Michael; Liu, Feng-Ying; Chou. 2002. “Going Private 
Restructuring and Earnings Expectations: A Test of the Release of Favorable 
Information for Target Firms and Industry Rivals.” Working Paper; 
Jensen, Michael C. 1986. “Agency Costs and Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Take-overs.” American Economics Review, 76(2): 323-329; 
 22 
Lehn, Kenneth; Poulsen, Annette. 1989. “Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in 
Going Private Transactions.” The Journal of Finance, 44(3): 771-787; 
Martinez, Isabelle; Serve, Stephanie. 2010. “The Delisting Decision: The Case of 
Buyout Offer with Squeeze-out (BOSO).” International Review of Law and Economics, 
31: 228– 239; 
Tutino, Marco; Panetta, Ida Claudia; Laghi, Enrico. 2013. “All You Need is Cash? 
Empirical Evidence on Key Factors in Delisting Process in Italy.” 3rd Annual 
International Conference on Accounting and Finance (AF 2013); 
Van Der Elst, Christoph; Van Den Steen, Lientje. 2009. “Balancing the Interests of 
Minority and Majority Shareholders: A Comparative Analysis of Squeeze-out and Sell-
out Rights.” European Company & Financial Law Review, 6(4): 391-439; 
Weir, Charlie; Wright, Mike. 2006, Governance and Takeovers: are Public-To-Private 
Transactions Different from Traditional Acquisitions of Listed Corporations? 
Accounting and Business Research, 36(4): 289-307; 
World Economic Forum. 2008. “The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity 




Table 1: Voluntary delisted companies’ distribution across years. 
Sample 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
FTSE Italia All-Share 11 9 14 10 6 50 
S&P 500 18 24 11 8 10 71 
Table 2: Deal type distribution across samples. 
Sample PTP Transactions M&A with Listed Companies Total 
FTSE Italia All-Share 33 17 50 




Table 3: Logit Model on the Italian market between voluntary delisted and still 
public firms. 






























































































































The table above shows the results in terms of coefficients, while z values are highlighted in 
brackets. The stars next to the brackets are useful to understand the significance level: * means 
that the result is significant at the 10% level; ** means that it is significant at the 5% level; *** 
shows significance at the 1% level. 
Table 4: Regression on CAR for the Italian sample. 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value Standard Error 
Controlling Sh. -.1445974 -2.59 0.014 .0557862 
Market-To-Book -.0016368 -0.14 0.887 .0114676 
EV/EBITDA .0002114 1.58 0.124 .0001342 
Debt-To-Equity -.0001189 -1.75 0.089 .0000679 
ln Market Value -.045542 -0.94 0.355 .0486245 
ln Total Assets .0352345 0.84 0.409 .0421427 
Intercept .1272098 0.86 0.397 .1483859 
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Table 5: Average Abnormal and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns’ 
distribution across time. 
 
Italian Sample 
S&P 500 Index 
Sample 
t (days) AAR CAAR AAR CAAR 
-3 0.005174 0.005174 0.000788 0.000788 
-2 0.015213 0.020387 0.00498 0.005768 
-1 0.014376 0.034762 0.005843 0.011611 
0 0.053347 0.088109 0.125096 0.136707 
1 0.011858 0.099967 0.004108 0.140815 
2 0.001275 0.101241 0.004324 0.145139 
3 0.004035 0.105276 0.005874 0.151013 
Table 6: Logit Model on the Italian sample regarding the difference between firms 
involved in PTP transactions and acquired by already listed companies. 



































































































Table 7: Logit Model on the S&P 500 Index sample regarding the difference 
between firms involved in PTP transactions and acquired by listed companies. 









































EV/EBITDA lagged  
-.0176656 
(-0.58) 






























The table follows the same guidelines as the previous two. 
Table 8: Number of Firms, CAAR and Standard Deviation per Deal Type across 
samples. 
 Number of Firms CAAR Standard Deviation 
Deal Type Italy S&P 500 Italy S&P 500 Italy S&P 500 
PTP Transactions 


















FTSE Italia All-Share 3.251147 52 0.001053 
S&P 500 0.464258 53 0.322289 
 
